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Abstract—Smart grid (SG) is an automatic electric power
transmission network with bidirectional flows of both energy and
information. As one of the important applications of smart grid,
charging between electric vehicles has attracted much attentions.
However, authentication between vehicle users and an aggregator
may be vulnerable to various attacks due to the usage of wireless
communications. Although several authentication schemes are
proposed for smart grid environments with privacy protection,
some of them still impose security issues such as anonymity
absence. In addition, most of the existing authentication schemes
have not thoroughly tackled the charging peak in their design,
so these schemes cannot guarantee the requirement in terms of
low energy consumption in smart grid environments. In order
to reduce the computational costs yet preserve required security,
the Chevyshev chaotic map based authentication schemes are
proposed. However, the security requirements of Chebyshev
polynomials bring a new challenge to the design of authentication
schemes based on Chebyshev chaotic maps. To solve this issue,
we propose a practical Chebyshev polynomial algorithm by using
a binary exponentiation algorithm based on square matrix to
achieve secure and efficient Chebyshev polynomial computation.
We further apply the proposed algorithm to construct an energy-
efficient authentication and key agreement scheme for smart
grid environments. Compared with state-of-the-art schemes, the
proposed authentication scheme effectively reduces the computa-
tional costs and communication costs by adopting the proposed
Chebyshev polynomial algorithm. Furthermore, the ProVerif tool
is employed to analyze the security of the proposed authentication
scheme. Our experimental results justified that our proposed
authentication scheme can outperform state-of-the-art schemes
in terms of the computational overhead while achieving privacy
protection.
Index Terms—Smart grid environment, Authentication, Key
agreement, Chebyshev Chaotic Maps, Privacy protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
SMART grids create a widely distributed network ofautomated energy delivery by using two-way flows of
electricity and information [1]. Compared with the traditional
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Fig. 1. the System Model of the Vehicle-to-Grid Network.
grid infrastructure, smart grids are more efficient, secure and
reliable. As one of the important applications of smart grids,
the vehicle-to-grid (V2G) network has attracted more and more
attentions due to the electric vehicles that are promising in
reducing pollution and integrating renewable resources [2]. As
shown in Figure 1, the V2G network contains three entities -
power grid, aggregator (AGT), and electric vehicles (EVs).
The power grid generates electricity from new renewable
sources, such as solar and wind, and then sends the resulting
electricity to the charging stations.
As an intermediary between the power grid and the EVs, the
aggregator monitors and collects the current state of the EVs,
optimizes and adjusts the EV charging plan, and minimizes
the charging energy cost of electric vehicles. When an electric
vehicle owner (EVO) intends to charge vehicle battery, he/she
first logs in to the system using a smartcard and credentials
through EV onboard unit [3]. Then the EV will send a request
to the AGT to establish communication between them. After
that, EVO can complete the payment by interacting with the
charging station.
However, the wireless communication technology adopted
in V2G networks may cause various security threats [4, 5].
User private and sensitive information (e.g. the user identity,
location and route of the vehicle) may be compromised
by several attacks, such as impersonation attacks, message
modification attacks, and etc. In practice, an attacker may
utilize public channels to invade user privacy information and
impersonate users to obtain services through V2G networks.
Furthermore, a malicious station may impersonate others and
charge more from users. Therefore, a security mechanism
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2should be provided to protect the user privacy information
during the charging process in smart grid environments.
Several authentication schemes have been explored to
achieve secure communication [3, 6–11]. In order to provide
high security, public-key cryptography has been applied in
the design of the authentication scheme for secure vehicle
charging services in smart grid environments. Despite the fact
that the public-key cryptography solutions enhance the secu-
rity, these existing authentication schemes still face another
challenge, i.e., energy limitation. The EV charging increases
the electric loads, potentially amplifying peak demand or
creating new peaks in electricity demand [8, 10]. One possible
scenario is that many EV owners go to charging stations after
work to recharge their EVs, creating a charging peak in a
short period of time. These charging activities can seriously
affect smart grid systems, which causing network losses and
increasing the likelihood of blackouts [12]. Furthermore, when
the charging requirements received by charging stations in-
crease significantly, it may cause congestion and then greatly
affects the convenience of users. However, most of the existing
authentication schemes do not fully consider the charging peak
in their design and fail to achieve a delicate balance between
security and performance due to the usage of time-consuming
operations such as expensive bilinear operations. Therefore,
how to design an energy efficient authentication scheme for
smart grid environments remains a challenging work.
A. Motivation
Although several authentication schemes are proposed for
smart grid environments, some of them still impose security
issues such as anonymity and perfect forward secrecy. In
addition, to avoid the congestion caused by charging peak
and provide more security and convenient services to EVOs,
the authentication scheme should be lightweight. However,
most existing authentication schemes have to rely on time-
consuming operations to ensure security which may not be
suitable for smart grid environments.
Chebyshev polynomials cryptosystem, as a promising
method, is expected to reduce computational costs while
preserving high security. However, the public key algorithm
based on Chebyshev polynomial to deal with real numbers
is not secure [13]. To solve this problem, the Kocarev et al.
[14] extended Chebyshev polynomials from real fields to finite
fields and finite rings, making the public key algorithm more
secure and practical. Later, Chen et al. [15] proved that the
Chebyshev polynomials Tn(x) mod N is safe when modulus
N is a strong prime number satisfying N-1=2p1 and N+1=2p2
, where p1 and p2 are also prime numbers. Therefore, modulus
N should be carefully selected to ensure that Chebyshev
polynomials can produce sequences of sufficient period to
resist violent attacks. However, in the existing Chebyshev
polynomials algorithms such as the algorithms adopted in
[16, 17], the parameter n of Chebyshev polynomials Tn(x)
mod N is constructed with small primes which brings a new
security challenge to the design of authentication schemes
based on Chebyshev chaotic maps.
These issues inspire us to design a practical Chebyshev
polynomials algorithm and then applied it to construct an
energy efficient authentication scheme for smart grid environ-
ments.
B. Contribution
In this study, we focus on solving the energy limitation
issue with privacy protection during authentication and key
negotiation process in smart grid environments. The main
contributions of our work are summarized as follows:
1) To solve the security challenge of Chebyshev polynomi-
als algorithm in authentication scheme design, we propose a
practical Chebyshev polynomial algorithm that adopts a binary
exponentiation algorithm based on square matrix to achieve
secure and efficient Chebyshev polynomial computation. The
proposed algorithm guarantees the security requirements that
are proved by Chen et al [15]. Also, our experimental re-
sults also justified that the proposed algorithm is an efficient
Chebyshev polynomial algorithm, thus it can be applied in our
designated authentication scheme to achieve both security and
efficiency.
2) Based on the proposed Chebyshev polynomial algorithm,
we further construct an energy efficient authentication scheme
for smart grid environments. The proposed scheme achieves
fast mutual authentication and key agreement with anonymity.
Furthermore, we employ an automatic verifier named ProVerif
to analyze the security of the proposed scheme. The security
analysis demonstrates that our proposed authentication scheme
can resist known attacks.
3) The proposed authentication scheme is a lightweight au-
thentication scheme since only the efficient Chebyshev polyno-
mials and hash functions are adopted during the authentication
and key negotiations process. The performance analysis shows
that the proposed authentication scheme is more efficient in
comparison with the state-of-art schemes.
C. Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II describes the related work. The mathematical background
of Chebyshev polynomial is described in Section III. In
Section IV our proposed Chebyshev polynomial algorithm is
introduced in detail. The proposed scheme is presented in
detail in Section V. In Section VI, the security of the proposed
scheme is analyzed. The performance of the proposed scheme
is discussed In Section VII. And the paper is concluded in
Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, various authentication and key agreement
schemes using public-key cryptography are proposed for smart
grids. To protect the private data transmitted in the smart grid,
Wu and Zhou [18] proposed a key management scheme using
public-key cryptosystem and symmetric key cryptosystem.
However, Xia and Wang [19] demonstrated that their scheme
[18] was vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. Although
another key distribution scheme was proposed by Xia and
Wang [19] to overcome the weakness of [18], the new scheme
[19] suffered from impersonation attacks [20]. Later, Tsai and
Lo [21] presented an anonymous key distribution scheme using
identity-based signature. However, their scheme [21] failed to
resist privileged-insider attacks [22].
3To further enhance the security and reduce the computa-
tional costs, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is adopted in
the design of authentication schemes. Based on ECC, He et al.
[23] proposed a key distribution scheme for smart grids which
achieved users anonymously and reduced the computational
costs. Odelu et al. [24] also presented a key agreement scheme
using ECC and analyzed their scheme with the CK-adversary
model. But their scheme [24] fails to resist impersonation
attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks, as pointed out in [25].
Then an ECC based self-certified key distribution scheme was
proposed by Abbasinezhad-Mood et al. [26] to realize higher
security. But their scheme requires the use of a tamper-proof
security module. Later, Mahmood et al. [27] presented an
ECC-based authentication scheme for the smart grid. How-
ever, their scheme fails to provide user anonymity since the
user identity is transmitted directly over the public channel
without protection. Recently, Kumar et al. [28] employed
ECC, symmetric encryption and hash function to construct
an authentication and key agreement scheme. Although ECC
based scheme reduces the computational costs, the EC point
multiplication operations involved in these schemes are still
time-consuming operations for smart grid environments.
Chebyshev polynomials as a lightweight operation are also
adopted in the design of authentication schemes. Chaotic
maps based authentication schemes have been applied to a
variety of environments, such as smart grids [29], multi-
server environment [30, 31], isolated smart meters [32] and
point-of-care systems [33]. Recently, Abbasinezhad-Mood et
al. [3] proposed a privacy preserving authentication scheme
for vehicle to grid connections by using Chebyshev chaotic
maps. Their scheme reduces the computational cost in the-
ory. However, they only execute each cryptography operation
independently on the devices and then calculate a theoretical
time as the execution time of their scheme. Obviously, it is
not appropriate to take the theoretical execution time as the
actual execution time of the authentication scheme.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review the basic concepts of Chebyshev
chaotic and the corresponding difficult problems associated
with it.
Definitionl 1 (Chebyshev Chaotic Map): Let n be an integer
and x∈[-1, 1], the Chebyshev polynomial is defined as (1) or
(2) [34–37].
Tn(x) = cos(n cos
−1(x)) (1)
Tn(x)=2xTn−1(x)−Tn−2(x);n≥2,T0(x)=1,T1(x)=x (2)
Definitionl 2 (Semigroup Property): One of the most im-
portant property of Chebyshev polynomial is the semigroup
property, which is shown as
Tu(Tv(x)) = Tuv(x) = Tv(Tu(x)) (3)
Zhang [38] demonstrate that the semigroup property of
Chebyshev polynomials also holds, when Chebyshev polyno-
mial domain is defined on intervals (−∞,+∞). The enhanced
Chebyshev polynomial is defined as (4), where p is a large
prime number
Tn(x)=(2xTn−1(x)−Tn−2(x))mod p,n≥2,x∈(−∞,+∞) (4)
Definitionl 3 (Chaotic Map-Based Discrete Logarithm Prob-
lem (CMBDLP))[37, 39, 40]: Given x and y, it is almost
impossible to find the integer v, such that Tv(x) = y. The
probability that an adversary A can solve the CMBDLP is
defined as AdvCMBDLPA (p) = Pr[A(x, y) = v : v ∈ Z∗p , y =
Tv(x)mod p].
Definitionl 4 (CMBDLP Assumption) [37, 39, 40]: For
any probabilistic polynomial time-bounded adversary A,
AdvCMBDLPA (p) is negligible, that is, Adv
CMBDLP
A (p) < ε.
Definitionl 5 (Chaotic Map-Based Diffie-Hellman Problem
(CMBDHP))[37, 39, 40]: Given x, Tu(x) and Tv(x), it is almost
impossible to find Tuv(x). The probability that a polynomial
time-bounded adversary A can solve the CMBDHP is defined
as AdvCMBDHPA (p)= Pr[A(x, Tu(x)mod p, Tv(x)mod p =
Tuv(x)mod p :u, v∈Z∗p ].
Definitionl 6 (CMBDHP Assumption) [37, 39, 40]: For
any probabilistic polynomial time-bounded adversary A,
AdvCMBDHPA (p) is negligible, that is, Adv
CMBDHP
A (p) < ε.
IV. CHEBYSHEV POLYNOMIAL ALGORITHM
In this section, we describe the proposed Chebyshev poly-
nomial algorithm in detail. In order to satisfy the security
requirements and reduce the time complexity of Chebyshev
polynomial algorithm, we adopt a binary exponentiation algo-
rithm based on square matrix to compute Chebyshev polyno-
mials. Furthermore, we employ the following matrices instead
of recursive relationships to define Chebyshev polynomials.[
Tn+1(x)
Tn(x)
]
=
[
2x −1
1 0
][
Tn(x)
Tn−1(x)
]
mod q
[
Tn+1(x)
Tn(x)
]
=
[
2x −1
1 0
]2[
Tn(x)
Tn−1(x)
]
⇒
[
2x −1
1 0
]n[
T1(x)
T0(x)
]
mod q
Fig. 2. Flow chart of Chebyshev polynomial algorithm.
4The nth power modulus q of the matrix
[
2x −1
1 0
]
can
be solved by the binary power algorithm in polynomial time.
The detailed steps of the proposed algorithm to compute Tn(x)
mod N are shown in Figure 2, where [n] represents the integer
part of n.
To meet the security requirements, in our proposed Cheby-
shev polynomial algorithm, n is a large prime number, and
modulus N is a strong prime number satisfying N-1=2p1 and
N+1=2p2. Therefore, our proposed algorithm is safe according
to [15]. Furthermore, we have implemented the Chebyshev
polynomial operations on Intel Intel Celeron CPU G3900T
to investigate the practicability of our proposed algorithm.
Table I illustrates that the proposed algorithm is an efficient
Chebyshev polynomial algorithm. Furthermore, from Table
I we can conclude that the execution time of Chebyshev
polynomial increases as the number of bits of parameter n
increases. The above conclusion also shows that the calculation
method of execution time adopted in [3] is inappropriate.
TABLE I
EXECUTION TIMES OF CHEBYSHEV POLYNOMIAL
The bits of parameter n Execution time
128bits 0.187385ms
160bits 0.235239ms
256bits 0.381572ms
512bits 0.754054ms
V. OUR PROPOSED SCHEME
Based on the proposed Chebyshev polynomial algorithm,
we construct a lightweight authentication scheme that aims
to reduce computational costs with high security. There are
four phases in the proposed scheme, system setup phase,
registration phase, login phase and authentication phase. In
the system setup phase, the trusted authority (TA) generates
system parameters and publishes public information. During
the registration phase, TA completes registration of the electric
vehicle (EVi) with a smartcard and the aggregator (AGTj) in
a secure channel. Then in the authentication phase, the EV
and AGT authenticate each other and establish session keys
for future communications. Some notations used throughout
the rest paper are described in Table II. And the procedures
of the proposed scheme are presented in detail as follows.
A. System Setup Phase
In the system setup phase, the trusted authority (TA) selects
system parameters and generates its key pairs. Meanwhile, TA
registers each aggregator AGTj before their deployment in the
network. The steps of this phase are given below.
Step 1: The trusted authority TA first chooses a large prime
number p, and then selects a high entropy random integer x
as the seed of Chebyshev polynomial.
Step 2: The trusted authority TA selects a high entropy
random integer k as its private key, and computes its corre-
sponding public key pubTA as in (1). Next, the TA generates
its identity IDTA and calculates a pseudo identity for itself
using the value IDTA and its private key k as (2)
pubTA = Tk(x) mod p (1)
TABLE II
EXECUTION TIMES OF CHEBYSHEV POLYNOMIAL
Notation Definition
IDi Identity of the ith electric vehicle
IDj Identity of the jth aggregator
x The seed of Chebyshev polynomial
p Large prime number
h(·) Secure hash function
r, ri, rj , ru, rs, r1, r2 high-entropy random numbers
k, pubTA Private and public key of TA
ki, kj Private key of EVi and AGTj
SKij , SKji Session key of EVi and AGTj
|| The concatenation operation
⊕ The exclusive-or operation
RIDTA = h(IDTA||k) (2)
Step 3: The trusted authority TA chooses a collision-resistant
hash functions h() : {0, 1}∗ −→ {0, 1}l. Then it publishes the
system parameters p,x, pubTA, h() and keeps its privacy key
k secretly.
B. Registration Phase
When an electric vehicle EVi wants to access the aggregator
AGTj , it needs to perform the following registration process.
In this phase, a smartcard is issued for each electric vehicle
owner and the communication channels are supposed to be
secure.
Step 1: The electric vehicle owner (EVO) freely chooses
his/her identity IDi and password PWi. Then, it selects a
high entropy random integer ri and calculates its pseudo
identity RIDi as in (3). It also adopts its identity IDi and
password PWi to compute RPWi as in (4). After that, EVO
sends message {RIDi, RPWi} to the trusted authority TA
through a secure channel. After receiving the message, the
trusted authority TA chooses a high entropy random integer
ru and then uses this integer, EVOs pseudo identity RIDi,
public key pubTA and private key k to obtain Qi as in (5).
Then, the TA further calculates the signature si as (6) via the
computed value Qi, pseudo identity RIDi, random integer ru
and private key k. Next, the TA adopts its private key k and
the computed value RPWi to generate Y as in (7). After that,
it writes {RIDTA, Y, Qi, si} into the smartcard and delivers
the smartcard to the EVO in a secure way. Upon receiving
the smartcard, EVO adopts Y stored in the smartcard and
its identity IDi to compute I as (8). And then it computes
the private key ki as (9) using its privacy information {IDi,
PWi, ri} and the signature si of the TA. Then, the EVO
stores the information {RIDi, ki} and replaces the Y with
I in the memory of his/her smartcard. Finally, the memory of
the smartcard contains {RIDTA, RIDi, I, Qi, si, ki}. After
this step, the EV/EVO finishes the registration at the TA.
RIDi = h(ri ⊕ IDi) (3)
RPWi = h(IDi ⊕ PWi) (4)
Qi = TRIDiTh(ru⊕k)(pubTA) (5)
si = h(RIDi||Qi)h(ru ⊕ k)k (6)
5Y = TRPWiTk(x) (7)
I = TIDi(Y ) (8)
ki = h(ri ⊕ IDi||PWi)si (9)
Step 2: Firstly, the aggregator AGTj generates its identity
IDj , and selects a high entropy random integer rj . Then it
calculates its pseudo identity RIDj as in (10) and sends it to
the trusted authority TA in a secure channel. After receiving
the message from the aggregator AGTj , the TA chooses a
high entropy random integer rs and computes Qj as in (11)
using this integer, the received value RIDj , its public key
pubTA and private key k. Then the TA further adopts the
computed value Qj , random integer rs and its private key
k to calculate the signature sj as (12). After that, it sends the
message {RIDTA, Qj , sj} to the aggregator AGTj through a
secure channel. Subsequently, the aggregator AGTj computes
its private key kj as (13) using the signature sj received from
the TA. Finally, the aggregator AGTj stores the information
{RIDTA, RIDj , Qj , sj , kj} in its memory secretly. When
this step is finished, the registration process of the aggregator
AGTj on the TA is completed.
RIDj = h(IDj ⊕ rj) (10)
Qj = TRIDjTh(rs⊕k)(pubTA) (11)
sj = h(RIDj ||Qj)h(rs ⊕ k)k (12)
kj = h(IDj ⊕ rj)sj (13)
C. Login Phase
In this phase, the registered EVO makes a login request to
the aggregator AGTj .
Step 1: The EVO first inserts the smartcard in the EVi and
inputs his/her identity IDi and password PWi.
Step 2: Then the electric vehicle EVi computes I0 using
the inputted identity IDi and password PWi as (14) to check
whether the value of I0 is equal to the value of I. If true, the
electric vehicle EVi chooses a high entropy random integer r1
and calculates C1 as (15) via the private key ki of the EVi.
Finally, the electric vehicle EVi sends the login request {C1}
to the corresponding aggregator AGTj via a public channel.
I0 = TIDi(Th(IDi⊕PWi)(pubTA)) (14)
C1 = Tr1ki(x) (15)
D. Authentication and key agreement Phase
After receiving a login request from electric vehicle EVi,
some messages need to transmit between the electric vehicle
EVi and the accessed aggregator AGTj to achieve the mutual
authentication and key agreement. In this phase, the EVi and
the AGTj perform the following steps:
Step 1: When the aggregator AGTj receives the login
request {C1}, it chooses a high entropy random integer r2
and calculates C2 as (16). And the aggregator AGTj further
computes X as (17) and C3 as (18). Finally, it generates an
authentication message Auths as (19) and sends message {C2,
C3, Auths} to the EVi via a public channel.
C2 = Tr2(Qj) (16)
X = Tr2kj (C1) = Tr1r2kikj (x) (17)
C3 = h(RIDj ||Qj)⊕ h(pubTA||RIDTA) (18)
Auths = h(X||RIDTA||C1||C2) (19)
Step 2: After receiving the responding message {C2, C3,
Auths} from the aggregator AGTj , the electric vehicle EVi
computes h(RIDj ||Qj) as (20) by adopting the received
message C3, the public key pubTA and the pseudo identity
RIDTA. Then it uses the computed value h(RIDj ||Qj), the
received message C2 and the EVOs private key ki to obtain
X
′
as (21). Next, the electric vehicle EVi computes Auths
′
as
(22) and compares it with the received authentication message
Auths. If they are equivalent, it computes I1 as (23) using the
private key ki and then it can obtain C4 as (24). After that,
the electric vehicle EVi uses the computed value X
′
and C4
to generate its authentication message Authu as (25). Finally,
the electric vehicle EVi computes the session key SKij as
(26) and sends the message {C4, Authu} to the aggregator
AGTj .
h(RIDj ||Qj) = C3 ⊕ h(pubTA||RIDTA) (20)
X
′
=Tr1ki(Th(RIDj ||Qj)(C2))=Tr1kih(RIDj ||Qj)r2(Qj) (21)
Auths
′
= h(X
′ ||RIDTA||C1||C2) (22)
I1 = h(RIDi ⊕ ki) (23)
C4 = h(RIDj ||Qj)⊕X ′ ⊕ I1 (24)
Authu = h(X
′ ||C4) (25)
SKij = h(RIDTA||X ′ ||I1) (26)
Step 3: Upon receiving the message from the electric vehicle
EVi, the aggregator AGTj first computes Authu
′
as (27). And
then it checks whether the equation Authu
′
=Authu holds. If
true, it computes I1
′
as (28) using the received message C4 and
the previous calculated value X, and then obtains the shared
session key SKji(=SKij) as (29).
Auth
′
u = h(X||C4) = h(Tr2kj (C1)||C4) (27)
I
′
1 = h(RIDj ||Qj)⊕ C4 ⊕X (28)
SKji = h(RIDTA||X||I ′1) (29)
Finally, the electric vehicle EVi and the aggregator AGTj
achieve mutual authentication and key negotiation. The login
and authentication also are shown in Figure 3.
Suppose that the EVi and the AGTj are legal. The SKij
is the session key generated by the EVi and the SKji is the
session key computed by the AGTj . Now we prove that the
equation SKij=SKij is held in our proposed scheme.
Proof : SKij=h(RIDTA||X ′ ||h(RIDi ⊕ ki))
=h(RIDTA||Tr1ki(Th(RIDj||Qj)(C2))||h(RIDi⊕ki))
=h(RIDTA||Tr1ki(Th(RIDj||Qj)(Tr2(Qj)))||h(RIDi⊕ki))
= h(RIDTA||Tr1r2kih(RIDj||Qj)TRIDjT(rs⊕k)(pubTA)||h(RIDi⊕
ki))
= h(RIDTA||Tr1r2kih(RIDj||Qj)h(IDj⊕rj)h(rs⊕k)k(x)||h(RIDi⊕
ki))
=h(RIDTA||Tr1r2kih(IDj⊕rj)sj (x)||h(RIDi⊕ki))
=h(RIDTA||Tr1r2kikj (x)||h(RIDi⊕ki))
=h(RIDTA||Tr2kj (C1)||h(RIDi⊕ki))
=h(RIDTA||X||h(RIDi⊕ki))
=SKji
6Fig. 3. Illustration of login and authentication phase.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we adopt an automatic verifier named
ProVerif to analyze the security of the proposed scheme.
Moreover, we discuss the possible attacks in Section VI-B.
A. Automatic Formal Verification of Security Using ProVerif
In this section, we demonstrate the security of our pro-
posed scheme using a widely accepted automatic protocol
verifier named ProVerif [41]. ProVerif can be utilized to verify
the correspondence assertions, observational equivalences and
reachability properties. Specifically, we can validate the resis-
tance of cryptographic protocols against impersonation attacks,
modification attacks, and replay attacks by launching injective
correspondence assertion queries. Moreover, by using obser-
vational equivalence queries, some security properties such as
identity guessing attacks can be verified via ProVerif. Fur-
thermore, by making reachability queries, both the anonymity
feature and the secrecy of the session key can be checked.
Significantly, ProVerif can also be used to verify the perfect
forward secrecy of the protocol by leaking some parameters.
So, we employed ProVerif tool to implement our proposed
authentication scheme and the authentication phase of the EVi
and the AGTj are shown in Figure 4.
Figure 5 indicates the results from the Proverif. From Fig.
5, the results (1)-(2) show that the adversary cannot obtain
Fig. 4. the authentication phase of the EVi and the AGTj .
the private key ki of the EVi and the private key kj of the
AGTj . Results (3)-(4) demonstrate the secrecy of the session
keys SKij and SKji. Results (5)-(6) prove the anonymity
of the EVi and the AGTj . Results (7)-(8) are the results of
two injective correspondence assertions which guarantees that
the mutual authentication between the EVi and the AGTj is
valid. In addition, injectivity allows the EVi and the AGTj
to check the freshness of received messages which can resist
replay attacks. Therefore, the results (1)-(8) prove that the
proposed scheme provides session key security, anonymity,
mutual authentication and can resist replay attacks.
Fig. 5. Results from the ProVerif (1).
Moreover, we also conducted experiments to demonstrate
that our proposed scheme provides perfect forward secrecy.
In our experiments, the private keys of the EVi and the
AGTj are transmitted over the public channel c, which means
long-term keys are leaked to the adversary. As the results
7(1)-(2) of Figure 6 shows that both ”not attacker(ki[])” and
”not attacker(kj[])” are false, which proves that the adversary
has obtained the ki and the kj . However, the results of ”not
attacker (SKij[])” and ”not attacker (SKji[])” are still true. It
demonstrates that even if the ki and the kj are leaked, the
session key SKij(SKji) cannot be compromised. Therefore,
the proposed scheme provides perfect forward secrecy.
Fig. 6. Results from the ProVerif(2).
B. Discussion on Possible Attacks
In this subsection, we discuss the security of our proposed
scheme by analyzing some possible attacks. In Section VI-A,
we have adopted ProVerif to demonstrate that our scheme pro-
vides perfect forward secrecy, session key security, anonymity
and mutual authentication and can resist replay attacks. So,
in this subsection, we focus on some other attacks that we
have not discussed in detail such as man-in-the-middle attacks,
smartcard stolen attacks, etc.
Man-in-the-middle attacks: In our scheme, the electric
vehicle EVi and the aggregator AGTj can share a session key
SKij(SKji) only after they authenticate each other. In Section
VI-A we have demonstrated that the proposed scheme achieves
mutual authentication via ProVerif, so the adversary A cannot
construct independent connections with either the AGTj , or
the EVi . Therefore, the adversary A cannot perform the man-
in-the-middle attacks successfully.
Modification attacks: Suppose that an adversary A modifies
the message sending by the AGTj with fraud {C∗2 , C∗3 ,
Auth∗s} and delivers it to the electric vehicle EVi to imper-
sonate the aggregator AGTj . However, without the knowledge
of the AGTjs identity IDj and the TAs secret key k, the
adversary A cannot construct a valid X to pass the verification
of EVi. Then the EVi will find these attacks by checking
whether the equation Auth
′
s=Auths holds.
On the other hand, assume that the adversary A modifies the
message {C∗4 , Auth∗u} and sends it to the AGTj . Similarly, if
the adversary A wants to pass the AGTjs verification, he/she
needs to construct a valid Auth
′
u=h(X
′ ||C4). However, the
adversary A cant generate a proper X
′
to pass the equation ver-
ification of Auth
′
u=?Authu. Therefore, our proposed scheme
can resist modification attacks.
Privileged-insider attacks: Assume that a privileged-insider
user of the TA is an adversary A, and he/she has the registration
message {RIDi, RPWi} of the EVi. In the proposed scheme,
the EVOs real identity IDi is protected by a secure hash func-
tion and a high entropy random integer ri during the whole
registration phase. Moreover, the EVOs PWi is also protected
by a secure hash function. So, the TA cannot obtain the EVOs
real identity IDi and password PWi, and thus cannot figure
out the I0 = TIDi(Th(IDi⊕PWi)(pubTA)) further. Therefore,
the proposed scheme can resist privileged-insider attacks.
Insider impersonation attacks: Assume a legal electric
vehicle EVa becomes a malicious adversary and try to im-
personate another legal EVi. However, without knowing the
EVis IDi, PWi, ri and si, the EVa cannot figure out the
EVis private key ki to pass the verification of the AGTj .
So, malicious electric vehicle EVa cant impersonate a legal
electric vehicle EVi to communicate with the AGTj . On the
other hand, when a registered aggregator AGTb becomes a
malicious attacker and try to impersonate another legitimate
aggregator AGTj , he/she needs to obtain AGTjs private key
kj . However, without the knowledge of AGTjs IDj , rj and
sj , the AGTb cannot calculate kj correctly. Therefore, our
scheme can resist insider impersona-tion attacks.
Offline password guessing attacks with/without smart-
cards: Assume that an adversary A obtains all the messages
transmitting between the EVi and the AGTj and tries to
launch an offline dictionary attack to get EVis password. To
obtain the PWi, the adversary A first needs to extract ki from
C1 which is equivalent to solve an instance of CMBDLP. Even
if the adversary A gets the ki, he/she still cannot obtain PWi
without the knowledge of EVis IDi, ri and si. Therefore, the
adversary A cannot launch offline dictionary attacks without
smartcards successfully.
Suppose that an adversary compromises all the private
information {RIDTA, RIDi, Qi, si, ki, I} stored in the
smartcard of the EVi and performs offline dictionary attacks
with smartcards. Compared with offline dictionary attacks
without smartcards, the additional information known by the
adversary A in this attack is the information {RIDTA, RIDi,
Qi, si, ki, I} stored in the smartcard. According to the
above discussion, the adversary A cannot obtain the EVis
PWi by using ki. Furthermore, when the adversary A tries
to extract PWi from I = TIDi(Th(IDi⊕PWi)k(x)), he/she
will face the CMBDLP. Even if the adversary A solves the
CMBDLP, without knowing the EVi s IDi and the TAs private
key ki, he/she still cannot guess PWi correctly. Thus, the
proposed scheme can resist offline password guessing attacks
with/without smartcards.
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we will compare the security features, com-
putational costs and communication costs of our proposed
scheme with other related schemes [3, 22, 24, 27, 28].
A. Comparison of Security Features
The security features of our proposed scheme and the other
five related schemes [3, 22, 24, 27, 28] are compared in
Table III. As shown in Table III, Mahmood et al.s scheme
[27] fails to provide user anonymity. Odelu et al.s scheme
[24] is vulnerable to impersonation attacks and man-in-the-
middle attacks. Although Wazid et al.s scheme [22] and Kumar
et al.s scheme [28] are successful against common attacks,
they involve time-consuming operations. Moreover, the related
schemes [3, 22, 24, 27, 28] dont provide automatic formal
verification of security. According to Table III, our proposed
scheme can resist various attacks and provide more security
features in comparison with the other five related schemes
[3, 22, 24, 27, 28].
8TABLE III
SECURITY FEATURES COMPARISONS OF RELATED SCHEMES
Security attributes [3] [22] [24] [27] [28] Ours
Replay attacks resistance
√ √ √ √ √ √
Man-in-the-middle attacks
resistance
√ √ × √ √ √
Modification attacks resistance
√ √ √ √ √ √
Privileged-Insider attacks
resistance
√ √ × √ - √
Insider impersonation attacks
resistance
√ √ × √ √ √
Offline password guessing
attacks resistance
√ √
- - -
√
Perfect forward secrecy
√ √ √ √ √ √
Session key security
√ √ √ √ √ √
Anonymity
√ √ √ × √ √
Low computational cost
√ × × × × √
Low communication cost
√ √ × × × √
Formal security analysis/proof
√ √ √ √ √ √
Automatic formal verification
of security × × × × ×
√
√
:Prevents the attack or provides the security property; ×: Does not prevent
the attack or does not provide the property; −: Does not discuss the security
property;
B. Computational Cost
In this subsection, we compare the computational costs of
our proposed scheme and other five related schemes. In our
experiments, we adopt OpenSSL library [42], GMP library
[43] and PBC Library [44] to simulate these schemes on
two Ubuntu 16.04 virtual machines with an Intel Intel(R)
Celeron(R) CPU G3900T 2.60 GHz processor, 4GB of RAM.
The simulation results are shown in Table IV. The notation Tb,
Te, Ts, Th, Tm, Ta and Tc denote the time for executing a
bilinear pairing operation, a modular exponentiation operation,
a symmetric key encryption/decryption operation, a one-way
hash function operation, a scalar multiplication operation of an
elliptic curve, a point addition operation of an elliptic curve
and a Chebyshev polynomial operation, respectively.
As shown in Table IV, the Odelu et al.s scheme [24] requires
performing four point multiplication operations of elliptic
curve, fourteen hash operations, five modular exponentiation
operations and two bilinear pairing operations to complete
the authentication. Then, the execution time is given by
4Tm + 14Th + 5Te + 2Tb and the actual simulation time was
23.973 ms. From Table IV, the computational costs of Odelu
et al.s scheme are much higher than other related schemes
[3, 22, 27, 28] and our scheme. That because Odelu et al.s
scheme [24] involves heavyweight operationsbilinear pairing
operations. In addition, from Table IV, the total execution time
of Wazid et al.s scheme [22], Mahmood et al.s scheme [27],
and Kumar et al.s scheme [28] is 15.347 ms, 17.436ms and
16.296 ms respectively. Compared with Odelu et al.s scheme
[24], these schemes [22, 27, 28] reduce the computational
costs effectively by avoiding the use of bilinear pairing op-
erations.
Furthermore, the proposed scheme requires to perform five
Chebyshev polynomial operations and six hash operations on
the EV side, and needs to execute two Chebyshev polynomial
operations and five hash operations on the AGT side. Then
the total execution time is given by 7Tc + 11Th and the
actual simulation time is 3.731ms. As shown in Table IV, the
computational costs of our scheme and Abbasinezhad-Mood
et al.s scheme [3] are 3.731ms and 5.18 ms, which are much
lower than other related schemes [22, 24, 27, 28]. According
to Table IV, our scheme and Abbasinezhad-Mood et al.s
scheme [3] outperforms the related schemes [22, 24, 27, 28] in
terms of the computational overhead. That is because efficient
Chebyshev polynomial operations are adopted in our scheme
and Abbasinezhad-Mood et al.s scheme [3].
TABLE IV
COMPUTATIONAL COSTS COMPARISON
EV/MDi/Ui/SM AGT/SMi/Uj /NAN Total
[3]
7Th + 4Tc
≈1.519ms
7Th + 4Tc + 2Ts
≈3.661ms
14Th + 2Tc + 8Ts
≈5.18ms
[22]
4Tm + 2Ta + 5Th
≈10.396ms
2Tm + 8Th
≈4.951ms
6Tm + 2Ta + 13Th
≈15.347ms
[24]
2Tm+7Th+2Te+2Tb
≈14.638ms
2Tm + 7Th + 3Te
≈9.335ms
4Tm+14Th+5Te+2Tb
≈23.973ms
[27]
4Tm + 3Ta + 4Th
≈10.124ms
3Tm + 3Ta + 4Th
≈7.312ms
7Tm + 6Ta + 8Th
≈17.436ms
[28]
3Tm + 2Ts + 6Th
≈7.972ms
3Tm + 2Ts + 7Th
≈8.324ms
6Tm + 4Ts + 13Th
≈16.296ms
Ours
5Tc + 6Th
≈2.613ms
2Tc + 5Th
≈1.118ms
7Tc + 11Th
≈3.731ms
As shown in Figure 7, the proposed scheme achieves the
best performance, taking only 3.731ms in total. And on the
AGT side, our scheme also achieves the lowest computational
costs, which only takes 1.118ms. Compared with other related
schemes [3, 22, 24, 27, 28], our proposed scheme reduces
the computational costs up to 28.0%, 75.7%, 84.4%, 78.6%
and 77.1% respectively. Therefore, the proposed authentication
scheme is an energy efficient authentication scheme and is
suitable for smart grid environments.
Fig. 7. Comparison of execution time in the login and authentication phase.
C. Communication Cost
The comparison of communication costs between our
scheme and the other related schemes [3, 22, 24, 27, 28]
is shown in Table V. In our experiment, the output of the
hash function is 20 bytes (160 bits), the output of modular
exponentiation operation is 32 bytes (256 bits), the output of
Chebyshev Polynomial is 32 bytes (256 bits), and the output
of a timestamp is 4 bytes (32 bits). In addition, for bilinear
pairing, the elements in group G1 and G2 are 40 bytes (320
bits) and 64 bytes (512 bits).
As shown in Table V, the proposed scheme achieves the
smallest communication load which is 1344 bits. And the
communication costs for other related schemes [3, 22, 24, 27,
28] are 1376bits, 1536bits, 1920bits, 2112bits and 2240bits,
respectively. Obviously, the proposed scheme reduces com-
munication costs in comparison with the related schemes
[3, 22, 24, 27, 28].
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COMMUNICATION COSTS COMPARISON
Schemes [3] [22] [24] [27] [28] Ours
Cost(bits) 1376 1536 1920 2112 2240 1344
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new Chebyshev polynomial
algorithm by using a binary exponentiation algorithm based
on square matrix. The proposed algorithm solved the secu-
rity challenge of Chebyshev polynomial algorithm in practi-
cal application and realized secure and efficient Chebyshev
polynomial computation. Based on the proposed algorithm,
we further designed an energy-efficient authentication and
key agreement scheme for smart grid environments. Since
only lightweight Chebyshev polynomials and hash functions
are adopted during the authentication and key negotiation
processes, the proposed authentication scheme reduces the
computational costs and communication costs in comparison
with the state-of-the-art schemes. We also adopted ProVerif
tool to analyze the security of the proposed authentication
scheme. The security analysis demonstrated that our proposed
authentication scheme can defend against various attacks.
Therefore, our proposed scheme is suitable for smart grid
environments due to tackling both security and performance.
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